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Contents

  1. German translation of 'religion'
  2. "+_.E(f)+"
  3. Read PDF Performativer Religionsunterricht (German Edition)
  4. Performativer Religionsunterricht (German Edition) by Christoph Zamilski -

Postmodern perspectives too tend to range along a continuum between two poles.

However, in the postmodern reading the battle has no overpower- ing state to keep the peace, as famously theorized by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan. The first variety turns up in normative reflection on immigration in the claim that the best we can hope for is, in the end, an always tenuous modus vivendi among conflicting cultural groups. Chapter 3 examines the issue of citizenship. Requirements for natural- ization as well as legal residence establish the most immediately relevant conditions under which immigrants live. What should and what does constitute the integral traits of our political identity?

To this fun- damental political question, we will see, there exist myriad conflicting an- swers that, however, generally fall within the normative contours formed by liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism.

German translation of 'religion'

The varying normative stances find their way into complex citizenship policies across Europe and cast doubt on the putative comparative claim that there exist distinctive na- tional understandings of citizenship, such as French republican, German ethnonationalist, and British or Dutch multicultural Goodman ; How- ard ; Koopmans et al. Chapter 4 investigates the veiling controversy.

The extraordinary sa- lience of this debate over a mere article of clothing stands as compelling testimony to the power of normative ideas to shape politics. Keep in mind that veiling is practiced by a minority of members of a minority religious sect in Europe. The policy of banning or permitting covering cannot, then, except in the wildest of imaginations, have serious material or nonnorma- tive consequences and thus motivations in the same way that, say, an open immigration policy can affect rates of unemployment or the de facto mini- mum wage.

And yet the headscarf controversy has often come to stand as a metaphor for the broader immigration debate as a whole, an extremely com- plicated and intricate subject matter that gets simplified down to whether one approves or disapproves of covering hair. On the face of it, the policy itself would appear straightforward: permit or proscribe veils. This is largely true, though the exact conditions under which veiling is permitted or pro- scribed vary widely.

Normative fragmentation shows up markedly in the arguments for and against banning. Put differently, liberal, nationalist, and postmodern fragments turn up coexisting and allying with one another, so 22 Chapter 1 to speak, on the side of banning the veil despite the fact that the broader theories from which they stem are philosophically incompatible. The same turns out to be true with the case against banning. The veiling controversy, then, offers a telling example of normative fragmentation and fragilization that make it possible for positions fundamentally at odds to combine in the messy business of politicking.

Chapter 5 addresses secularism. Once considered a fait accompli that unequivocally positioned Europe in the vanguard of history and progress, secularism today is being revisited by Europeans, Muslim and non-Muslim alike Habermas ; Casanova Muslim fundamentalists and Is- lamists, estimated at four or five million strong in Europe, tend to resist secularization, often highly conspicuously and controversially.

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They con- tend that European-style secularism unjustly requires the pious to relegate their religious beliefs and practices to the private sphere, degrading them to a level of superficiality on par with a pastime. Muslim resistance has led some Christians to reevaluate the deal that they struck with the secular state and to press for a larger, even leading place for Christian heritage and be- lief in the public sphere.

Postmodernists see in the reopen- ing of the secularism question a perfect example of why it is immature folly to consider any normative order so self-evidently superior that it can remain immune to politicization. Secularism is anything but cut-and-dried in Eu- rope, and rapidly changing policies toward Islam, Christianity, and other creeds are moving in many different directions. Chapter 6 analyzes the issue of domestic security.

Indeed, they bleed into every dimension of immigration, including the three case studies of Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

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Thus, is she hiding a bomb beneath that burqa? Are they harboring a terrorist cell in that mosque? Should we be more suspicious of our Muslim citizens and residents than the rest? Such questions evoke the specter of a dark European past. Is Europe in the process of recreat- ing a category of second-class citizens analogous to the Jews of yesteryear? Are Europeans resurrecting on their own soil the kind of apartheid regimes they once imposed in their colonies?

In arguing that such a grim process is well under way if not completed, postmodern and postcolonial voices have given some of the stigmatized Muslims reason to think that they must take their defense into their own hands. Even rumor and innuendo of such rebel- lious undertakings have stirred nationalist calls to unshackle the state and fully enable it to protect the nation by whatever means necessary.

What has changed regarding security is that what were once considered extraordinary means, such as torturing and terrorizing, the mere mention of which raised Introduction: Clashes within Civilization 23 automatic moral indignation, have been de-tabooed and are now being dis- cussed as arguably appropriate responses to perceived insecurity.


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Chapter 7 concludes the book by suggesting ways in which its approach contributes to the broader corpus of literature studying immigration. Keenly aware that fragilized voters can be persuaded by a broad, almost kaleidoscopic melange of normative stances, political actors in different contexts opportunistically invoke well- sounding fragments of philosophically incompatible normative world- views with little or no concern for consistency. Viewing them as impro- vising bricoleurs who deploy fragments of the three public philosophies like tools in a tool kit enables us to better expose and comprehend policy messiness.

The approach of normative bricolage provides a more nuanced way of understanding the impact of moral arguments on the politics of im- migration than the conventional Left-Right dichotomy employed in many studies Sainsbury ; Howard ; Lahav By interpreting the normative discourse as a Kulturkampf that has ensued for centuries across the whole of Europe and beyond , this book furthermore aims to offer a refreshing and revealing alternative to the conventional nation-state com- parisons that stress path dependency and distinct national styles Good- man ; Koopmans et al.

The motto of Enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude! Have courage to use your own understanding. As intimated in the preceding chapter, I contend that none of the three public philosophies has been able decisively to discredit or defeat its rivals philosophically or politically. Each public philosophy has distilled such compelling arguments for its integral tenets that it has proven able to defend itself against philosophical or political marginalization. The endur- ing normative stalemate produces fertile ground for the emergence of mutu- al fragilization. Although each public philosophy doubtless has its share of staunchly committed proponents, a great number of political activists and citizens develop normative ambivalence.

The latter results from a combina- tion of budding diffidence regarding moral stances with which one closely identifies and creeping sympathy toward positions with which one does not closely identify. Mutual fragilization intensifies with fragmentation — that is, when normative slogans become detached from the systematic mother philosophy and deployed as performative utterances designed to sway po- litical actors.

Empirical demonstration of both mutual fragilization and fragmentation will have to await the case study chapters. Kulturkampf 25 The current chapter aims to familiarize readers with liberalism, nation- alism, and postmodernism as public philosophies. I want to create enough familiarity that readers can easily identify liberal, nationalist, or postmod- ern fragments as such when they come forth in the discourse on the Muslim question treated in subsequent chapters. I also aim to prepare readers for mutual fragilization. This I do by deliberately presenting generous inter- pretations of liberalism, nationalism, and postmodernism.

I portray each public philosophy in its own terms and best light. I lay special stress on the reasoning buttressing arguments that figure prominently in the politics of immigration in Europe. Rather than side with a particular public philoso- phy, I wish to impress upon readers the plurality of persuasive normative outlooks that deal with European Muslims.

Liberalism The intellectual origins of liberalism lie in the European Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

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Pioneering thinkers of that era, such as Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and many others, argued that liberty, equali- ty, reason, and progress represent righteous ends befitting all human beings. For the philosophies of the Enlightenment the most redoubtable obstacles standing in the way of this lofty ideal were ignorance and tyranny taught and imposed by the unholy alliance of altar and crown. The for the most part Roman Catholic church was accused of preaching not only error and superstition but also, worse, blind obedience to authority.

Of the many human tragedies and follies that resulted from rampant credulity none came in for more scorn than the religious wars all too fre- quently endorsed by priests and waged by princes.

Performativer Religionsunterricht (German Edition) by Christoph Zamilski -

For what? On behalf of a being, who exists only in their imagination, and who has made himself known only by the ravages, disputes, and follies, he has caused upon the earth. Tocke 48 , for example, in Two Treatises of Government [], excoriated the doctrine as nothing more than a continuation of the state of war of every man against every man wherein, however, the monarch has an overwhelming advantage. This did not necessarily have to mean an antipathy for religion per se. Whether atheist, deist, or otherwise, Enlight- enment thinkers generally shared the belief that reason rather than scrip- ture, human rather than divine authority, ought to be the final arbiter on earth of what was true or false Spragens The moral philosophers postulated the existence of a rationally ordered metaphysical universe whose eter- nally valid moral laws, like natural physical laws, were comprehensible through reason.

Kant xi de- clared reason supreme in all matters: Our age is the genuine age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion through its holiness and legislation through its majesty seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they in- cite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination. The great appeal of reason lay in its presumed universal accessibility.

All humans were postulated to have the capacity to think rationally, one Kulturkampf 27 reason debate should be free and public. The universality of human reason confirmed the moral validity of equality and liberty for all. For centuries elites of various stripes had sought to legitimize their superior power by proclaiming their superior wisdom. But if all humans possess the equal ability to reason and reason is the final arbiter of right and wrong, it followed that all persons must be naturally and fundamentally equal.

Be- ing subject to the laws of a government formed by the rational consent of the governed or social contract was not seen as a violation of individual liberty. The rational consent of the governed meant that democratic law amounted to self-legislated morality rather than heteronomy. Quoted in Ruggerio Rational, free, and equal persons could be expected to improve their lot both individually and collectively.

The Enlightenment bequeathed to posterity an extraordinary enthusiasm for progress. No one deserved to be deemed so destitute, be- nighted, or subjugated that the liberating rays of enlightenment could not shine upon him. Because it claims to be a self- legislated morality, liberalism requires persons who are granted liberty and equality to act rationally and progressively. Essentially, it needs persons nei- ther to prevent nor to endanger their own freedom or that of anyone else.

If they do either, they cast doubt on the very universality of human reason on which liberalism morally rests. There has long been a debate within liberalism regarding how much government intervention, if any, is needed to achieve liberal ends. Isaiah Berlin famously analyzed the debate as one between negative and positive freedom. Liberal voluntarism wants persons to have free choice, while liberal perfectionism wants them to make the right choice. It deserves underscoring that the two represent poles between which liberal philosophers and philosophies gravitate rather than enclosed camps with firm delineations of members Kulturkampf 29 and nonmembers.

Liberal voluntarism worries more about governments that make mis- takes than individuals who do so. Individuals should be free to err because error can represent an important dimension of the beneficial learning process leading into maturity. By contrast, when the state errs, its errors ramify widely. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. For he would thereby not only achieve the very opposite of ethical ends, but also undermine his political ends and render them insecure. As experience with relatively freer societies accumulated, it became obvious that free persons would not, as many Enlightenment thinkers had hoped, converge on a unified vision of the good life.

As mentioned, Berlin argued that there were equally rational and compelling reasons for embracing liberalism as there were for espousing nationalism, even though the two philosophies were incompatible and in- commensurable. The fact of reasonable pluralism which characterizes a society with free institutions makes this impossible. From the perspective of liberal voluntarism, the fact of reasonable plu- ralism should not alarm the state.